M ost physiological
scientists have restricted understanding of probability as relative frequency in a large collection (for example, of atoms). Most #appropriate for the relatively circumscribed problems of the physical sciences, this understanding of probability as a physical property has conveyed the widespread impression that the "proper" statistical "method" can eliminate uncertainty by determining the "correct" frequency or frequency distribution. However, many relatively recent developments in the theory of probability and decision making deny such exalted statistical ability. Proponents of Bayes's subjectivist theory, for example, assert that probability is "degree of belief," a more tentative idea than relative frequency or physical probability, even though degree of belief assessment may utilize frequency information.
In the subjectivist view, probability and statistics are means of expressing a consistent opinion (a probability) to handle uncertainty but never means to eliminate it. In the physiological sciences the contrast between the two views is critical, because problems dealt with are generally more complex than those of physics, requiring judgments and decisions. We illustrate this in testing the efficacy of penicillin by showing how the physical probability method of "hypothesis testing" may contribute to the erroneous idea that science consists of "verified truths" or "conclusive evidence" and how this impression is avoided in subjectivist probability analysis.
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Malvin notes in Advances in Physiology Education
(10) that many science students today assume verified absolute truths constitute science. Actually, the inherently tentative nature of science seems to be frequently forgotten at every societal level. Whereas it may be psychologically natural to abhor uncertainty, several authors and scientific societies (2, 4, 7, 10, 16) have noted that the degree of expectation of "the answer" in our highly technological era has become alarming. Consumers expect (and receive) "conclusive evidence." In recent reports sponsored by the National Science Foundation (7) and the American Association for the Advancement of Science (2) major criticisms of science education center around the lack of attention given to the "how" of the scientific process.
This lack may, in part, be due to general unfamiliarity of scientists and science educators themselves, especially those of us in the "harder" sciences, with relatively modern developments in the handling of uncertainty. For the most part, these developments have come from mathematics and the social sciences, and they systematically address, in a wide-A PERSONAL V I E W ranging way, the problem of uncertainty and scientific inference (4, 8, 9, 14, 15) . Many of them center around expanded notions of probability, the most significant concept in relation to uncertainty. Yet, as physiologists, almost all of our acquaintance with scientific inference and its necessary uncertainty is based on a very restricted notion of probability as the relative frequency of a repetitive event. Most specifically applicable to the circumscribed problems of the physical sciences, probability as relative frequency often yields comparatively definite "answers, " and much uncertainty therefore seems to disappear It was primarily in answer to these questions that a more generalized notion of probability developed in statistics and decision theory. This notion is not difficult to understand in a general way, because it is in accord with the common understanding of "probable" (4, 15). As such, an introduction to this understanding should be relevant to scientist, to student, and to consumer alike.
PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS IN PHYSIOLOGY
In physiology the handling of uncertainty would seem to be the function of "statistics." However, when the authors first learned a little statistics, as commonly applied in physiology and medicine, we recall feeling confused, and others have felt the same (1, 13). The confusion almost always seemed to center around what statistical applications were meant to achieve, i.e., the meaning and use of statistical analysis. For example, suppose we were uncertain about whether to give penicillin for treating infection. For simplicity in this discussion, we could study this by treating 900 patients with penicillin and finding what proportion was cured. If 480 were cured, the application to binomial sampling (4, 5) of "hypothesis testing" (12) , a ubiquitous statistical method, indicates that 480 cured out of 900 tested calls for "rejection of the null hypothesis (of cure by chance) at the 2.5% level" (one-tailed test). It seemed to us that this phrase meant that the null hypothesis had only a 2.5% probability of being true; that is, that the "experimental" hypothesis that penicillin can cure infection was very likely to be correct. [Usually, "null hypothesis" refers to that hypothesis that explains the experimental results obtained as due to "chance" (or "random"), also called the "statistical" hypothesis, as opposed to the "experimental" hypothesis of an effect due to the actual treatment being studied.] However, one of the founders of the most widely used statistical
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methods, Neyman (12) , explains that this interpretation is not permissible. Rejection of the null hypothesis means only that, if the experiment on 900 patients were repeated time after time, then the statistical hypothesis (of cure of 480 patients by chance) would be true in 2.5% of these experimental trials, and this is a certainty.
Expressed another way, the statistical technique of hypothesis testing (also known as "significance testing") has given us, in this 2.5% proportion, an objective "property" of random cure in a large collection of trials or events, or of the "population" (actually, the number of events, in principle, has to be infinite), not the probability of cure in any single or finite number of treatments. That is, the technique has not told us that our treatment is "prob-
ably" effective, as this is ordinarily understood. Known as the "P value," this 2.5% proportion is sometimes designated as the a priori value of making an error in the significance test ("the a").
Is the relative frequency of cures by chance in an assemblage what we wanted to know? Often, it is not, ideally, because the practical question many would ask remains unanswered (1, 13, 16) conclusions about the unknown from the known, that is, the probability of cure ofpatientx, knowing what happened to patients A through W, or, in differential diagnosis, the probability that a patient suffers from a particular illness among several possibilities. Having the function of enlarging what we know already and comprising the core of scientific inquiry, the results of inductive reasoning are always uncertain and therefore tentative. What has happened in our example, then? Instead of a tentative answer to a question about whether an uncertain event will occur ("Probably, this patient will benefit.") -that is, an inductive inference -we have received a certain answer, but to a different and recondite question that we did not ask.
Perhaps inability to make practical sense of Neyman's careful delineation of the exact meaning of hypothesis testing explains the tendency of investigators to interpret the procedure's results as inductive inferences anyway (l), although, for the sake of reviewers, the quality of "objectivity" is what must be conveyed in reports (3, 13, 16). How did this confusing situation arise of trying to substitute a factual answer for what seems to many users of this tool to be the common, ordinary question of probabilistic judgment?
Subsequently, we understood better that the most prevalent form of hypothesis testing [that due to Neyman and Pearson (12) ] was an application of the "relative frequency" concept of probability (5, 6), where P(E), the probability of some event E by definition can only mean its relative frequency of occurrence in an infinite number of random repetitions of some experiment ("long run"). Relative frequency probability is also known as "physical probability" (5) "objective probability" (5) or as a "physical constant" (6)) because relative frequency probability is analogous to the proportion of some physical quantity (say, the percentage content of tin in bronze). This notion of probability as a sort of property seems to be the most often used idea of probability in the physical sciences. As explained in the careful treatment of probability by Feller (5) relative frequency probability does not admit of inductive inference, consistent with Neyman's explication of hypothesis testing. For example, in physics, a paradigmatic problem is the probability distribution of the (absolute) velocities of the lO23 independent and indistinguishable molecules of an ideal gas in some volume, V, under precise, physically specifiable conditions. Here, if the probability distributions of the velocities are assumed to be orthogonally independent and the same for all components of every molecule, then the probability distribution of velocities must be the normal, Maxwellian relative frequency velocity distribution (4). This is a specified property of a physical system with truly infinite possibilities. In contrast to our penicillin example, this distributional property of an infinite assemblage is actually the quantity of immediate interest (because it determines the temperature, pressure, energy, and other desired thermodynamic characteristics of the volume of gas). No judgment about an unknown from a known is involved.
A PERSONAL V I E W Laudable for its ability to solve the precise and circumscribed problems of statistical physics, the seemingly uncritical adoption of relative frequency analysis by physiologists for a sweeping variety of problems seems contrary to the usual care taken in using any research tool. Perhaps there were no alternative means of handling uncertainty.
BAYES'S PROBABILITY THEORY
We discovered that there were alternatives to probability analyses based on relative frequency. This was surprising, because few investigators or physiology teachers seemed to be aware of them, although Murphy (11) ing the basics of assessing probabilities and decision making under a variety of conditions of uncertainty (4, 8, 9, 14, 15) . Contradicting the monolithic impression of many of us in the physical and biological sciences about the objectivity of this concept, several thinkers explain that probability is a more general and, actually, more familiar and subjective idea whose use can lead to the naive sorts of conclusions we had first expected. The work of these thinkers is known as Bayesian or, more exactly, subjectivist Bayesian theory. So far, the medical literature on the topic, both texts (11) and articles (1, 3, 16), seems to confine treatment to Bayes's statistical techniques. Yet, more important in our view and to some Bayesians themselves (4, 15) are the general ideas and the philosophy of subjectivist analysis.
Two Bayesian characteristics are especially relevant in the pedagogical context of this article (4, 8): 1) Bayesian analysis is closely analogous to the scientific process itself; and 2) Bayesian analysis emphasizes deliberative thinking and communication of that thinking in an open and honest way as major components in themselves of analysis. Therefore, science starts with initial uncertainty about one or more parameters; data are then collected; and, in light of the new information, initial uncertainty is reduced. Uncertainty is not eliminated except in very special cases of scientific laws. A scientific report is then generated that ideally presents both the data and the assumptions made in using the data to draw conclusions. This also describes subjectivist analysis of uncertainty, which begins with any event, E, whose outcome is uncertain, whether or not repetitive, and an initial probability, P(E), assigned by you to that event. Known as the "prior probability" or just the "prior," P(E) is your degree of belief that E will occur on the basis of what you know now. On the basis of new information, your uncertainty about E may then be reduced to yield, for you, a new degree of belief, P(E/I), read "my probability now of E, given what I knew before plus what I have subsequently learned (I) ." The Bayesian then emphasizes that reporting P(E/I) requires specification of P(E) and the assumptions underlying it, as well as "the data" (I). It is emphasized, in close analogy with science, that (fundamentally) the process does not generate certainty but only a tentative opinion (a belief! a guess!) relative to our assumptions and current state of information, that is, an inductive inference (4, 5, 8). (However, sometimes there may be general agreement about a prior probability distribution that will imply use of a particular Bayesian technique. See below.)
What does "degree of belief' mean here? Lindley (8) explains that it is not different from the ordinary use of probability when we say: "Probably, Allan will win the fellowship. " This concept seemed, then, to be consonant with our initial (naive) idea of probability in "probability of a penicillin cure." But how do we know degrees of belief exist as numbers obeying the usual rules of probability? Some of the major changes in our understanding of probability have centered around mathematical demonstration that a sions of how likely you deem it is that Ei will occur, given your assumptions and information now. As more information (I) becomes available, new probabilities, P(Ei/I), are assessed by a systematic procedure (Bayes's Theorem) that is specifically elimination of some of the alternatives Ei based on information and recalculation Of P(Ei) for the possibilities remaining by the constraint [c P(Ei/I) = I] (that is, renormalization).
For example, if in the toss of a well-balanced die, you deem important the event, E, of the appearance of a particular face, the alternatives Ei are 1, 2, 3, . . . 6. If all you know at the outset is the die's physical symmetry, that is, you have no knowledge of how the die is held, and so on, you may not have more belief that any one face will appear than any other. The consequent assignment of equal probability to each face, plus the constraint that 2 P(Ei) = 1, then implies initial probabilities P( 1) = P(2) = . . . P(6) = l/6, because 6 -l/6 = 1. However, suppose that after a toss, you were told that an even-numbered face had appeared.
This added information would be used by you to suppress 1, 3, and 5 as possible outcomes and to spread the total probability "mass" now over 2, 4, and 6. Therefore, How do we use P(cure) = 53% in subjectivist analysis? This introduces a whole field, decision theory (9) but to oversimplify, the idea is to compare the possible outcomes of treatment vs. nontreatment. Assuming recovery has a value ("utility") of 1 and death a utility of 0, treatment has a "subjective expected utility" (SEU) of 0.53-l + 0.47-O = 0.53, which is to be compared with the SEU of no treatment: 0.50-l + 0.50-O = 0.50. Treatment is therefore to be preferred to nontreatment in this example.
The exchangeable process just discussed differs from the binomial process (5) which we considered earlier in relation to hypothesis testing. In the binomial theory, instead of P(cure) of a patient or P(W) in a draw, we really have only a 50%frequency of W in infinitely repeated chance drawings from an urn of tied, 50% W composition. Instead of P(480 W in 900 draws), we have a chance frequency of 480 W in 900 draws in a long-run series of repeated experiments on 900 patients. Expressed otherwise, chance binomial sampling is repeated "independent sampling with constant probability (frequency) of success," where independence is aproperty [that disallows P(cure/I)]; this is the basis of Neyman's explication that hypothesis testing makes no provision for learning from experience.
In contrast, for the subjectivist, "chance" here is not something definite but only an imprecise idea, a synonym for "uncertain" or "minimally informed," and therefore capable of different conceptualizations (4). Therefore, do you, the investigator, initially having assigned 50-50 to the chance of cure before clinical tests, really believe that your assessment would remain unaffected by 500 (or 5!) subsequent successful trials? If not, the binomial process is inconsistent with your actual beliefs about the testing process. That is, for the subjectivist, the binomial process (in our example), with its beliefs about independence and Iixed probability, is only one particular idea about an uncertain situation that in this case should be rejected in favor of exchangeability, which is in greater accord with your true beliefs.
To summarize, in Bayesian probability theory and/or Decision Theory, subjective probability developed as a byproduct of the exigencies of decision making under uncertainty. Although it is sometimes criticized as too subjective for objective science, on the contrary, we do not believe that there is an acceptable alternative to Bayes's emphasis on clear acknowledgment of what is subjective in science, particularly for pedagogy.
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